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Reviving Proxy Marriage
Andrea B. Carroll∗
Ask people to identify the most important event in their lives and their answers bear an
overwhelming resemblance. The day of their marriage ranks near the top of the list for virtually
all.1 Entry into the marital relationship is a decision we approach with much contemplation and
reflection.2

Typically the decision is not made whimsically.

Indeed, popular culture has

admonished us that “only fools rush in,” a virtual axiom in today’s society.3 Nonetheless,
American states recognize without exception that marriage is merely a contract.4 It creates
myriad rights and responsibilities5—essentially conferring a status6—but the parties’ relationship
is at base nothing more than a contractual one.
Still, modern society has elevated the marriage contract above all others. This distinction
has overwhelmingly focused on the very personal nature of the marital relationship, a feature
nonexistent in the arms-length contractual dealings with which we are accustomed to working
when applying contract law.7 As a result, marriage is subject to a number of requirements, even
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1
See Andrew Sullivan, Why the M Word Matters to Me: Only Marriage Can Bring a Gay Person Home, TIME, Feb.
16, 2004, § 7.
2
See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VIR. L. REV. 1225, 1254–55 (1998).
3
ELVIS PRESLEY, Fools Rush In, on ELVIS NOW (1971).
4
52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 4 (1970). See generally SCHILLEBEECKX, MARRIAGE, HUMAN REALITY AND SAVING
MYSTERY 388 (1965) (contractual basis of marriage came from the Roman consensus idea of marriage adopted by
the Roman Catholic Church).
5
55 C.J.S. Marriage § 1(a) (1948). See also Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; Or, I Gave Him the
Best Years of My Life, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 272 (1987) (“Even seemingly vague and poetic marriage vows imply,
yet conceal, a set of rights and obligations that are generally understood by the parties.”).
6
55 C.J.S. Marriage § 1(b) (1948) (“Marriage is generally considered a civil contract differing in notable respects
from ordinary contracts, but it is also and especially a status or personal relation in which the state is deeply
concerned and over which the state exercises exclusive dominion.”).
7
Id. 1 BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 3 (6th ed. 1881) (“While the contract remains a mere agreement to marry,
it is not essentially different from other executory contracts. . . . But when it is executed in what the law accepts as a
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at the level of contractual formation, which are unknown to the general law of contract.8 With
the exception of the thirteen American jurisdictions allowing common law marriage,9 spouses
must participate in person in a formal marriage ceremony at which they express their free
consent and affirm their intent to undertake the marital relationship, with all the rights and duties
it entails.10 Typically, a qualified officiant must preside11 and witnesses must be present to
solidify the union.12 No other contract is subjected to as high an entry requirement—a solemn
ceremony—as is marriage.13 Moreover, the application of one of the most fundamental doctrines
of contract law, namely, that a contracting party need not formally enter into the contractual
relationship himself but may instead designate an agent to act on his behalf,14 is generally viewed
as inapplicable to the marital relationship.15 So-called “proxy marriages,” then, whereby one

valid marriage, its nature as a contract is merged in the higher nature of the status.”). See also Scott & Scott, supra
note 2, at 1248. See generally Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
8
See id. at 1289. See also Bishop v. Britain Investment Co., 129 S.W. 668 (Mo. 1910) (“[W]hile we speak of
marriage as a civil contract, yet that is a narrow view of it. The consensus of opinion in civilized nations is that
marriage is something more than a dry contract. It is a contract different from all others.”).
9
A common law marriage is a marriage between two people who did not obtain a marriage license nor solemnize
their union by formal ceremony. Although state laws vary, it generally requires the mutual consent of the parties to
the marriage, cohabitation, and a public declaration that the parties are husband and wife. Hurley v. Hurley, 721
P.2d 1279, 1284 (Mont. 1986). Common law marriage is permitted in Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas,
Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Washington, D.C. Wall v.
Williams, 11 Ala. 826 (Ala. 1847); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-109.5 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-1.1
(West 2003); Gammelgaard v. Gammelgaard, 77 N.W.2d 479 (Iowa 1956); Smith v. Smith, 165 P.2d 593 (Kan.
1946); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-403 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. § 457:39 (2004); Fisher v. Fisher, 243 P. 730, 731
(Okla. 1925); Holgate v. United Electric Rys. Co. 133 A. 243, 243 (R.I. 1926); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-360
(YEAR); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (Vernon 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (West 2004); Hoage v. Murch
Bros. Const. Co., 50 F.2d 983, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
10
Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law § 283 (1971).
11
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9: 202 (YEAR) (“A marriage ceremony may be performed by (1) priest, minister,
rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, or any clergyman of any religious sect, who is authorized by the
authorities of his religion to perform marriages, and who is registered to perform marriages; (2) A state judge or
justice of the peace.”).
12
State law varies on the number of witnesses required to perfect a ceremonial marriage. For example, Arizona
requires two witnesses, while Connecticut does not require any witnesses so long as the officiant is qualified or the
parties reasonably believe him to be. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-125 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-24
(West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
13
But see Comments, 15 TUL. L. REV. 436, 436 (1941) (describing elaborate ceremonial procedures for transferring
title to real property in medieval times; such form requirements no longer exist today).
14
FLOYD RUSSELL MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 80, 48 (1914).
15
Id. §§ 124, 126, 86–87.
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party authorizes an agent to stand in his stead at the marriage ceremony, are widely disdained in
the United States.16
Agency theory, we say, is simply not well-suited to application in the marital context,17
and thus a proxy marriage is not a valid marriage at all in most states.18 Only five American
states have recognized otherwise, and nearly all in an exceptionally narrow context involving
military personnel.19 So serious is the contempt for proxy marriage that the doctrine has been
rejected throughout most of this country for almost seventy years.20 But things have changed
and it is now time to reevaluate the efficacy and equity of continuing a distinction between
marriage and all other contractual relationships to which agency theory applies.
Society has evolved in a much more mobile direction.21 Its members more often find
themselves separated by great distances, by different means and for different reasons than they
did in the past.22 Thousands of couples desiring to marry are unable to fulfill ceremonial
marriage requirements because active military service makes travel impossible.23 Far more often
these days, other employment commitments require one party to live away from home for an
extended period and make personal participation in a marriage ceremony impossible or

16

Emily Post, Etiquette, in THE BLUE BOOK OF SOCIAL USAGE, Ch. 26. “The Day of the Wedding” (Funk &
Wagnalls Co., New York, 1937). See also Marvin M. Moore, The Case for Proxy Marriage, 11 CLEV.–MARSHALL
L. REV. 313, 313 (1962).
17
MECHEM, supra note 14, § 124, at 84–85.
18
See supra note 15. See also 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 15 (“Under the law of some states, parties cannot be
married by proxy. In such states the personal presence of both the bride and the groom at the marriage rites is
essential to the proper solemnization of the marriage, and a marriage by proxy is invalid as a ceremonial marriage.”).
19
CAL. FAM. CODE § 420 (West. 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-109 (2005); 89 Op. Att’y Gen. 261 (1980),
1980 WL 117668 (Kan. A.G.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-301 (2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.006 (Vernon 2006).
20
NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 154 (Harvard University Press,
2000).
21
See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 413 (1990);
D. ELAZAR, BUILDING CITIES IN AMERICA: URBANIZATION AND SUBURBANIZATION IN A FRONTIER SOCIETY 16
(1987) (describing the “nomadism” of the American people as one of the hallmarks of American life).
22
See Bradway, supra, at 112–14; see generally Briffault, supra note 21.
23
Moore, supra note 16, at 313; Bradway, supra, at 114.
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impracticable.24 In what was perhaps the highest profile proxy marriage attempted in the United
States, for example, a Russian cosmonaut working while orbiting Earth aboard the International
Space Station in 2003 married his Texan bride by proxy through the use of an agent standing in
for the groom at NASA.25 Same sex partners around the country, who may now legally marry in
six American jurisdictions,26 might avoid the cost and other significant burdens of traveling to a
state permitting same sex marriage by appointing proxies and remaining in their home state.27 In
each of these situations, denying parties who strongly desire to take on the contractual
obligations of the marital relationship deprives them—and, worse still, their children—of the
many personal and property rights afforded to married persons.28
Perhaps more importantly, the law has evolved as well. Agency theories, once relegated
almost exclusively to commercial transactions,29 now have application to scores of personal

24

See Briffault, supra note 21, at 413. See, e.g., Government Jobs Overview, Federal Jobs Net,
http://federaljobs.net.overview.htm (“Many federal workers’ duties require travel away from their duty station to
attend meetings, complete training, or perform inspections while others—such as auditors, instructors, field
engineering crews, and safety investigators—may require extensive travel for weeks or months at a time. Some
employees are on continuous travel. . . .”).
25
James Oberg, Cosmonaut in world’s first space wedding, MSNBC.com, Aug. 12, 2003, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3077947/.
Internationally, many of history’s most famous couples were married by proxy. Napoleon married Maria
Louisa by proxy in 1810 with an Archduke performing his role. JOHN S.C. ABBOTT, THE HISTORY OF NAPOLEON
BONAPARTE 122 (Harper & Bros. Pubs. 1904). Marie Antoinette and King Louis XVI were also married by proxy.
JEANNE-LOUISE HENRIETTA, MEMOIRS OF MARIE ANTOINETTE, QUEEN OF FRANCE & WIFE OF LOUIS XVI 38-39 (PF
Collier & Sons Pubs. 1910).
26
New Hampshire, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Vermont, and the District of Columbia allow marriages
between same sex partners. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457-A:1 (2004 & Supp. 2008); Elizabeth Kerrigan et al. v.
Commissioner of Public Health et al, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Katherine Varnum et al. v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d
862 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Vt. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §
1201–07 (2007); D.C. CODE § 32-701(3) (2009). In addition, the tribal law of the Coquille Indian Tribe in Oregon
permits same sex marriage. COQUILLE INDIAN TRIBAL CODE § 740.010(2) (2008).
27
See Kevin Lavery, Online Gay Marriage Seen as Game-Changer, npr.org, Dec. 14, 2009, available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121283017 (describing the serious economic boon that might
be fostered if states allowing gay marriage allowed parties to seek marriage licenses online). See also Adam
Candeub & Mae Kuykendall, E-Marriage:
Breaking the Marriage Monopoly, draft available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1491704.
28
See infra Part III.A.2.
29
MECHEM, supra note 14, § 10, at 5 (“If agency be deemed to belong to contractual representation properly, it will
at once be seen that it belongs to a condition of society in which commercial transactions are highly developed. A
non-commercial society, while it might have much use for servants, would have little need of agents. The historical
condition seems to accord with this conclusion.”).
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dealings. Among other things, one can, only as a result of legal developments in the last thirty
years, appoint an agent to make end-of-life decisions,30 appoint an agent to draft a will,31 even
appoint an agent to exercise custody over one’s child.32 In other words, agency doctrine has
permeated the most personal of our relationships, save the marital relationship.
The time has come to reassess our long-standing intolerance of proxy marriage. To that
end, Part I of this article surveys the history of proxy marriage from early Roman times to today,
with a view toward providing an explanation for the doctrine’s negative perception, both in the
United States and abroad. Part II describes the reluctance to sanction proxy marriage based on
the theory that agency law is not properly extended to exceptionally personal transactions and
challenges the assumption that marriage is too personal to be governed by agency principles
given their application to other intimate dealings. Part III details why proxy marriage is needed
in today’s mobile society from an equitable standpoint and describes how existing protective
mechanisms inherent in agency law can ensure the continued integrity of proxy marriages.
Finally, this article argues that it is time to stop singling out the marital contract as unworthy of
the regime of agency. A widespread revival of proxy marriage is long overdue.
I.

THE VALIDITY OF PROXY MARRIAGE: THEN AND NOW

The history of proxy marriage is as long as it is sordid, with some arguing that its first
recognition dates back to biblical times.33 It was a well-accepted means of perfecting a marriage
in both of the world’s great legal traditions—civil law and common law—in antiquity, remained

30

See infra Part II. Pennsylvania was the first state to enact a special durable power of attorney for health care
decisions in 1983. Cynthia M. Garraty, Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care: A Better Choice, 7 CONN.
PROB. L.J. 115, 119 (1992) (citing to 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601–07 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008). By 1992,
thirty-two states had done so. Id. at 120.
31
See infra Part II.A.
32
See infra Part II.B. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:951 to 954 (2008).
33
See, e.g., Luke B. Henry, California & Proxy Marriage, 27 J. ST. B. OF CAL. 294 (2952) (“The first recorded
instance of a marriage contracted by proxy is said to have been when Rebecca offered water from the well to the
servant of Abraham who had been empowered to find a wife for Abraham’s son, Isaac.”).
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possible through the middle ages, and likely even took hold in the American colonies. In fact,
proxy marriage was practiced somewhat prolifically in the United States until just after World
War I, when racial and immigration concerns led to its virtual demise. Today, the possibility of a
valid proxy marriage in America is rather scant. Much of the rest of the world holds quite a
different view, however, making the legality of proxy marriage a controversial issue over which
nations regularly engage in vigorous debate.34
A.

The Genesis and Development of the Proxy Marriage Doctrine
The validity of a proxy marriage was recognized at some point across almost all societies.

Even those groups who seem most likely to abhor the doctrine—in particular, organized religious
groups such as the Roman Catholic Church—embraced proxy marriage as necessary and
equitable. As a result, proxy marriage rather easily gained acceptance in the United States,
though after its introduction here the doctrine quickly became loathed and ultimately was
abrogated.
1.

Roman Acceptance of Marriage by Messenger

For the ancient Romans, marriage was viewed as a contract, a relationship “based solely
upon the agreement of the parties to take each other from that moment as husband and wife.”35
Thus, the only requirement of entering into a valid marriage was consent, mutually expressed.36
No particular ceremony or officiant was required in Roman times, and the consent of the spouses

34

See Egon Schwelb, Marriage and Human Rights, 12 AM. J. COMP. L. 337, 365–69 (1963).
Ernest G. Lorenzen, Marriage by Proxy and the Conflict of Laws, 32 HARV. L. REV. 473, 474 (1919).
36
F. SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 111 (1951). This has been true, at least, since the time of Alexander the
Great. See Charles Donahue, Jr., The Case of the Man Who Fell into the Tiber: The Roman Law of Marriage at the
Time of the Glossators, 22 ANN. J. LEGAL HIS. 1, 12 (1978). In more ancient times, the consent of the bride was
altogether unnecessary, though Roman law evolved to require the consent of both the bride and groom. A. A.
Roberts, Marriage by Proxy: Including a Brief Consideration of the Nature of Marriage and of Agency, 60 S.
AFRICAN L.J. 280, 284 (1943). Additionally, a paterfamilias’ consent to the marriage of a child under his power was
required. Susan Treggiari, Ideals and Practicalities in Matchmaking in Ancient Rome in THE FAMILY IN ITALY FROM
ANTIQUITY TO PRESENT 94 (David I. Kertzer & Richard P. Saller, eds. Yale Univ. Press, 1991).
35
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was not required to take on any particular form.37 As in all contracts, expressions of consent
could be made in writing, orally, and perhaps even tacitly.38
This perception of marriage as mere civil contract was taken quite seriously, so much so
that Roman authorities viewed the expression of consent, at least for a man, as possible not only
in person, but also through a letter or the use of an agent, which were acceptable means of
consenting to ordinary contractual relationships.39 Thus, the Roman law permitted a man away
from home to perfect a marriage in his absence through the use of a messenger.40 The intended
husband’s use of a proxy in this manner created a perfectly valid marriage.41

The same

possibility of marrying by proxy did not extend to an absent woman, however, largely because of
Roman views with regard to the appropriate course of conduct between parties immediately after
the marriage ceremony.42 The notion was that wife needed to be led into the domicile of the
marriage such that the parties could officially begin their married life, and the marital domicile
was necessarily that of the husband in early Roman times.43 It was therefore not possible for
wife to use a proxy to perfect the marital contract because she could not then be led to the marital
domicile. The Roman husband, however, was free to marry by proxy at will.44 By roughly 550,
the requirement that the wife be led to the home of the husband was no longer a clear legal
mandate, though it persisted for some period as a custom.45 Thus, by the middle of the sixth

37

Id. at 95–96.
Id.
39
Lorenzen, supra note 35, at 474.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Roberts, supra note 36, at 284.
43
Id. at 284.
44
DIGEST 23.2.5; Roberts, supra note 36, at 284.
45
DIGEST 23.2.5; Roberts, supra note 36, at 284.
38
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century, proxy marriage had fully taken hold as a legally permissible manner of creating the
marital relationship.46
This rather complete acceptance of the doctrine of proxy marriage by Roman citizens and
jurists would prove significant. The spread of Roman law throughout nearly all of Europe47 and
its role in shaping the civil law of a number of European countries more than six centuries later48
ensured proxy marriage a continuing presence in the international legal landscape.49
2.

Canon Law’s Surprising Approval

Perhaps even more significant to the long-term survival of the proxy marriage doctrine
than its Roman law reception is the warm welcome it received in the Roman Catholic canon law.
One might assume that marriage was always inextricably linked with religion, but the link did
not actually appear in law until approximately 541. The Corpus Juris Civilis, the Emperor
Justinian’s influential compilation of early Roman law,50 required that all but citizens holding
high office “betake themselves to some place of worship and declare their intention” to a church
official before several witnesses such that the church could document the marriage.51 Canon law
certainly recognized marriage as a legal relationship, a contract. But in requiring that the parties
celebrate the perfection of their contract in the church and with the blessing of a priest, the canon
law sought primarily to provide the marriage publicity, i.e. to “bring the fact of marriage to the
notice of the church.”52 Ensuring that the marriage was entirely voluntary—that the parties did
truly consent to the creation of the contract—might best be described as an afterthought, a

46

Roberts, supra note 36, at 284.
See PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 40–41 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005).
48
See id. at 43–49.
49
See infra, Part I.B.2.
50
Eric Gillman, Note, Legal Transplants & Investment Agreements: Understanding the Exportation of U.S. Law to
Latin America, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 263, 263 (2009).
51
Roberts, supra note 36, at 285–86.
52
Lorenzen, supra note 35, at 476.
47
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positive side effect of the requirement that marriages take place in a church.53

On the

background of this aim to bring couples into the church to celebrate their marriage contracts,
canon law was required to take a legal stance on proxy marriage, in essence, to determine
whether one spouse’s failure to personally declare consent before witnesses and a priest was
sufficient to taint the entire marriage with nullity. Rather surprisingly, the canon law view was
that it was not.
Centuries later, in 1215, proxy marriage aroused great attention at canon law when the
Roman Catholic Church, under Pope Innocent III’s leadership, fully sanctioned the Roman view
of the validity of a marriage perfected with one party using a stand-in.54 In a development
somewhat progressive for the time, however, canon law modified the Roman rule to make it
possible for either husband or wife to marry by proxy. Thus, the possibility of proxy marriage
became rather well-accepted, and gender-neutral, in the canon law of the early thirteenth
century.55
More than one hundred years later, under Pope Boniface VIII, the church’s approval of
proxy marriage persisted, though not without some dissatisfaction. A number of church officials
voiced opposition to the continuing acceptance of proxy marriage, suggesting that the marital
contract is one “of such far reaching consequences that [consent] should be expressed in person
instead of by proxy.”56 Even in the face of this opposition, however, the church continued to
treat proxy marriages as valid. The majority view was that there is an in-person expression of
consent by a principal to a proxy marriage. Agency theory views the agent as the principal, such
53

By the time of the Council of Trent in 1563, issues relating to the voluntariness of consent to the marital
relationship had gained more sway. CARRIERE, DE MATRIMONIO § 4; EMIL FRIEDBERG, LEHRBUCH DES
KIRCHENRECHTS 490 (1895). See also Lorenzen, supra note 35, at 476 (“Since the Council of Trent (1563)
matrimonial consents must be exchanged according to the Canon Law before a priest and at least two witnesses.”).
54
2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 369 (1895). See also
Lorenzen, supra note 35, at 475.
55
Lorenzen, supra note 35, at 474.
56
Id. at 475.
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that when an agent expresses his assent to a contract, the principal, has essentially “pronounce[d]
the words” himself “through the [agent’s] mouth.”57
By the time of the Roman Catholic Church’s most important ecumenical council—the
Council of Trent in 1563—the church’s internal debate over the permissibility of proxy marriage
had reached a fever pitch again, with disagreement centering upon whether the appointment of a
proxy was to be done in the same form as the expression of consent in the marriage ceremony
itself, namely before a priest and at least two witnesses.58 Focusing on the core intent of canon
law’s ceremonial requirement, again, to publicize the marriage to the church, the prevailing view
was that ceremonial requirements need not extend to the contract created between an intended
spouse and the proxy he appointed to act on his behalf, as the form of this agency contract did
not bear in any way on the church’s knowledge of the marriage.59 Thus, at the termination of
Council of Trent late in the sixteenth century, proxy marriage was still very much a part of canon
law.
3.

English Common Law Reception

The early English common law of marriage, much like Roman law, focused virtually all
of its marriage requirements on ensuring the voluntary consent of both spouses. And thus, a
solemn ceremony at which the husband pledged to love, comfort, honor, keep his wife in
sickness and health, and remain faithful to her, and the wife to do these and also to obey and
serve her husband, was a critical part of any English marriage ceremony.60 Such declarations

57

Id.
Id. at 476.
59
Id. at 476.
60
WILLIAM TEGG, THE KNOT TIED: MARRIAGE CEREMONIES OF ALL NATIONS 19–20 (1877).
58
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were intended to assure that the contracting parties “seriously weigh and consider” married life
and express consent only after fully analyzing the rights and duties the relationship will bring.61
The English ceremonial requirements necessarily raised the question of whether
marriages contracted with the parties outside each others’ physical presence, such that they
would be unable to make the necessary declarations in person, could have validity. On this
question, the English answer was clear. The Church of England wholly adopted the canon law
view of proxy marriage.62 Marriages between absent persons could be validly contracted by
letter, by messenger, or through the use of agents.63 The only exception at English law, which
was apparently not a requirement of either the Roman or canon law systems, was that parties to a
proxy marriage “have some notice or intelligence” of the other party to the marital relationship,
“for unto those who be utterly unknown to us, we cannot yield or consent no more than it is
possible for us to love them, of whom we have never heard.”64
With that one narrow exception, proxy marriage was as well accepted in England through
the eighteenth century as it was in the rest of the world.65 Indeed, proxy marriage has a place
among some of the most famous in English history. Queen Mary of England married Phillip II
of Spain in a proxy ceremony in 1554, with a Count Egmont standing in for the groom.66 King
James I of England married Anne of Denmark in August of 1589 by proxy.67 After the proxy
ceremony, Anne set sail to Scotland but was forced by storm to the coast of Norway; in what has
been described as the “one romantic episode of his life,” the King sailed with three-hundred men

61

Id. at 20.
Id. at 21–22. See also Lorenzen, supra note 35, at 480–81.
63
Lorenzen, supra note 35, at 481.
64
Id. at 481.
65
See id. at 481. The first recorded evidence of proxy marriage in England is in Lyndwood’s Provinciale, written in
1430. WILLIAM LYNDWOOD, PROVINCIALE (1430). See also Lorenzen, supra note 35, at 480.
66
WILLIAM HICKLING PRESCOTT, HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILLIP THE SECOND, KING OF SPAIN, Vol. 1, 90–91
(1902); TEGG, supra note 60, at 51.
67
Hugh Chisholm, Anne of Denmark, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 69–70 (11th ed. 1910).
62

11

to meet his new bride.68 And proxy marriage in old England was neither restricted to nor
practiced solely among nobility.

Ordinary citizens separated by substantial distances were

known to perfect marital relationships from afar as well.69
4.

Proxy Marriage’s Post-Colonization Survival?

When the British migrated to America in the seventeenth century, they were said to carry
their law, which still legitimized proxy marriage, with them.70 The new American colonies
essentially adopted English law after their colonization.71 It is virtually universally accepted,
however, that the new colonies adopted English law only to the extent it was suited to their
unique colonial conditions.72
While there is no hard and fast evidence that colonial American law sanctioned proxy
marriage, the colonial embracement of British law strongly suggests that proxy marriage was
permitted in early America. “That [marital] consent might be expressed by an agent was
admitted by Roman law, by the canon law, and . . . by the English law as late as the eighteenth
century.”73 The only remaining question is whether colonists might have rejected the British law
sanctioning proxy marriage as unsuited to the times.74 That is highly unlikely. Proxy marriage
was likely even more closely tailored to fit American colonial society than it was their British
counterpart. “Many a colonist must have left a sweetheart behind when he first ventured over
seas. [Still others] must have desired, after becoming established in this country, to marry

68

DAVID HARRIS WILLSON, KING JAMES VI AND I 85 (1956).
See generally SWINBURNE, ESPOUSALS 162 (2d. ed.) (“Betwixt them that be absent, Spousals or Matrimony can be
contracted three manner of ways; that is to say, by Mediation of their Proctors, or of Messengers, or of Letters;
provided nevertheless in every of those Cases, that the Parties have some notice or intelligence the one of the other,
at hand by Fame or Report; . . .”).
70
Lorenzen, supra note 35, at 482.
71
Id.
72
See id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
69
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someone whom they had known in their native land.”75 In either situation, a trip to the homeland
merely for the purpose of perfecting a marriage was as time consuming as it was cost
prohibitive.76 Proxy marriage was precisely the legal device to solve the problem created by the
distance gap. It “would enable the woman to become the man’s wife before leaving” her home
country on a long and arduous journey to the colonies.77
As a result, though there is very little evidence in colonial law of a wholesale acceptance
of proxy marriage,78 its suitability for colonial times and the fact that American states in the
decades following colonization seemed to recognize the possibility of a proxy marriage rather
clearly, make it a near certainty that proxy marriage did migrate to the new world along with its
British settlers.
5.

The Twentieth Century: Marriage, War, Prostitutes, and “Picture Brides”
Intertwined

If proxy marriage was legally sanctioned in colonial America, it went virtually
unrecognized for decades. But around the turn of the twentieth century, and for the following
forty years, the possibility of proxy marriage garnered substantial new interest. The reason for
the renewed attention paid to the old—perhaps even dying—doctrine was clear. Two World
Wars raised new social problems to which the traditional conception of ceremonial marriage
provided no just solution.
Servicemen stationed overseas strongly desired the ability to use proxy marriage to make
formal unions for which they were unable to express consent in the physical presence of their
intended wives. “The first World War, when only four million men were in the armed forces,
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occasioned a demand whose dimensions impelled the Judge Advocate General of the Army to
provide a form of contract for marriage by mail. There are indications that in the second World
War, when over eleven million persons were in the armed forces, the need for a valid form of
marriage between absent parties assumed even greater proportions.”79 And because family law
at the time branded children born outside of wedlock as illegitimates not entitled to the same
legal rights and protections as children born of a marriage,80 more than these servicemen’s sense
of pride and emotion was at stake. “Children fathered by servicemen before embarkation”
deserved a means of legal protection that ceremonial marriage could not provide.81
As a result, many members of the armed forces in both world wars engaged in proxy
marriages, despite the lack of clarity as to whether such marriages carried the force of law in
early twentieth-century America.82 Some scholars of the time argued that these marriages were
no doubt legally valid.83 Others argued the need for more clarification as to the validity of a
marriage ceremony conducted with the use of an agent84 and a few state legislatures responded
with narrowly tailored bills recognizing the validity of proxy marriages between absent
servicemen and their partners.85

Still other states decried the practice of proxy marriage

altogether, begrudging its perceived disastrous impact on American immigration policy.86
Regardless of the generally prevailing view of the propriety and necessity of proxy
marriages for military personnel, a growing fear and loathing of the practical effect of a broad
79

Lillian M. Gordon, Marriage by Proxy: The Need for Certainty and Equality in the Laws of the American States,
20 SOC. SERV. REV. 29, 32 (1946).
80
See Christopher C. Brown, Illegitimacy and Veteran’s Benefits Legislation, 21 HOWARD L.J. 421, 424 (1978).
81
The Validity of Absentee Marriage of Servicemen, 55 YALE L.J. 735, 737 (1946).
82
Id. at 734.
83
See Comments, 25 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 181 (1952) (“The validity of a proxy marriage may be sustained on either
or both of two basic theories. The first and more common theory upholds the proxy marriage as being a valid
common law marriage . . . . The more recent and intricate approach sustains the act as being a valid ceremonial
marriage which fully complies with the technicalities of the jurisdiction.”).
84
Validity of Absentee Marriage, supra note 81, at 737.
85
Gordon, supra note 79, at 33 (describing New Jersey and Georgia bills to permit proxy marriage for servicemen
on duty).
86
Id

14

approval of proxy marriage for all members of society reached new heights in the 1920s.
Concern over proxy marriage was largely fueled by immigration policy, racism, and a staunchly
held American view of love-based marriage not widely accepted in many other cultures at the
time.87
The crux of the growing distaste for approval of proxy marriage stemmed from a gatekeeping problem. If American soldiers stationed overseas were permitted to marry their brides
from a distance, then the law effectively recognized absentee marriages conducted by proxy.
And once the law admitted the possibility of valid absentee marriages, it was confronted with the
possibility that the absent spouse might not be an American citizen serviceman stationed abroad.
Rather, an absentee marriage with the assistance of a proxy might be conducted between an
American citizen, present in person for the marriage ceremony, and his bride located abroad.
And while the base legal transaction was the same—one American citizen in the United States
marrying another not present in the United States for the ceremony—perception of the two
situations differed immensely. Men who desired to marry foreign brides by proxy were dubbed
scoundrels, pimps, or worse.88
The core of the problem was that immigration rules which have persisted in this country
for nearly a century provide for easy, automatic, and permanent resident status in the United
States for the spouse of any American citizen.89 When American men began to use proxy
marriage to choose foreign brides, with those women eventually emigrating to the United States,
concerns arose along two fronts. First, the Bureau of Immigration90 became worried that the
87
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doctrine of proxy marriage was being abused as a means of bringing foreign prostitutes into the
United States.91 That concern was racially tinged. Immigration officials at the time “suspected
all Jews at entry points; only Asians drew more fire.”92 Immigration agents believed that ninety
percent of Japanese and Chinese women immigrating to the United States at the time were
actually brought in as prostitutes.93 Second, even when it was clear that a proxy marriage did not
involve the immigration of a prostitute, American officials disdained the continuation of proxy
marriage and the benefits it conveyed on spouses living abroad because they believed it led to the
proliferation of “picture brides” entering America. These picture brides—the early twentieth
century equivalent of today’s “mail order bride”94—entered the country after a proxy marriage to
an American husband, typically without even having met him before landing on American soil.95
Asian immigrants were again the suspect class here, and marriages involving Japanese and
Korean immigrants were particularly scrutinized.96 Throughout much of the twentieth century,
those cultures generally accepted the idea of arranged marriage,
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whereby “economic

bargaining” and building “kinship networks” through marriage was important.98 Such motives
for marriage were antithetical to the American culture of the time, which had already fully
committed to the idea of purely love-based marriage.99 Regarding picture brides, “the whiff of
compulsion of the couple by extended family members, the possible instrumentalism of the
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marriage choice, and the importance of monetary consideration all ran against the American
grain. An arranged marriage represented coercion.”100 Thus, proxy marriage began to be viewed
negatively as a means of skirting societal norms surrounding marriage.
Though fear was at its peak, precisely how much abuse of the doctrine of proxy marriage
and its resulting immigration benefits actually existed is still unclear. Newspaper headlines of
the time “screamed out… ‘Japanese Picture Brides Are Swarming Here’.”101

But when

“pressured by the Japan Association of America, the Bureau of Immigration conceded that only
865 proxy brides landed in San Francisco during the year from June 1914 to June 1915. The
California population at the time numbered nearly 3 million.”102 Still, as a result of concerns
over prostitution and the motives of those marrying by proxy, American officials in 1924 took
the substantial step of declaring that “any marriage performed when one of the parties was in the
United States and the other in a foreign country was invalid for immigration purposes.”103 The
rule was exceptionally broad, as it seemed to disapprove of all proxy marriages no matter where
perfected, at least so long as they were relied upon to confer immigration status. By 1924, then,
the view of proxy marriage began to morph and sentiment disfavoring the doctrine became
overwhelming, even if confined to the immigration context.
To be sure, American servicemen stationed abroad continued to use proxy marriage to
perfect unions with their American brides even after 1924 and continuing through both World
Wars.104 Such unions posed no immigration complications. But in view of the previouslyexisting uncertainty over the legality of these marriages, the move toward a rejection of proxy
marriage as a viable means of perfecting a legal union, if only in the immigration context,
100
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signaled an important shift in American thinking. By the late 1920s, proxy marriage was
viewed, at best, as a necessity in only the most exceptional circumstances, and even then,
through skeptical lenses. And though proxy marriage peaked again briefly during World War II,
it became “dormant” shortly afterwards.105
B.

A Dying Institution?: The Status of Proxy Marriage Today
Today, proxy marriage enjoys mixed levels of acceptance around the globe. In the

United States, rather widespread tolerance of the doctrine faded quickly after the second World
War.106 In peace time during a period in which American society was less mobile,107 the
doctrine of proxy marriage fell into desuetude. It has not yet been completely extinguished from
the legal landscape in this country, but its recognition is a rarity at best.
Internationally, the reception of proxy marriage as a valid means of creating the spousal
relationship has enjoyed far more longevity. This greater continuing European acceptance of
proxy marriage became evident in the early 1960s, when the United Nations Convention on
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration of Marriages declined to
require the presence of both parties at a marriage ceremony in order to create a marriage which
brings about “‘the natural and fundamental group-unit of society’: the family.”108 The United
Nations’ refusal to prohibit proxy marriage was one of the most controversial family law issues
of the Convention, with a number of jurisdictions strongly advocating on each side of the
issue.109
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Indeed, the United Nations’ debate over proxy marriage “made it clearer than the
consideration of any other issue to what extent . . . the world was still divided on the concept of
marriage.”110 Even forty years after those initial United Nations discussions, divisions persist.
The American view of the impermissibility of proxy marriage is simply not one shared globally.
1.

Limited American Law Recognition

These days the possibility of perfecting a valid proxy marriage in the United States has
grown remote. Only a handful of states approve the practice111 and most do so on a very limited
basis. And even in states which rather liberally sanction the creation of a marital relationship by
proxy, little reported litigation exists to flesh out the details of the law.
All but one of the five states allowing proxy marriage does so expressly by statute.
Kansas statutes provides perhaps the least clarity on the issue. In its legislation detailing the
solemnization requirements of a Kansas marriage, proxy marriage is not mentioned at all.112
Kansas simply requires a marriage license and a particular type of officiant.113 The statute
neither sanctions nor prohibits marriages conducted by proxy. Nonetheless, in response to
requests for guidance from state district judges, the Kansas Attorney General has issued a
number of opinions on the validity of proxy marriages in the state, and every Attorney General
opinion on this issue since the first in 1944 is consistent.114 In the absence of an express
legislative prohibition, proxy marriages are legal in Kansas.115 The requirement is simply that
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the person who will not attend the marriage ceremony give a valid power of attorney to the
proxy.116
Texas statutes provide slightly more guidance.

Persons “unable to appear for [a

marriage] ceremony” are authorized to appoint a proxy by affidavit.117 The statute is broad,
insofar as it does not restrict the class of persons authorized to make use of a proxy marriage.
Setting ceremonial requirements aside, Texas even allows parties to act by proxy in seeking a
marriage license,118 but only if the party seeking the license by proxy is “on active duty as a
member of the” state or federal armed forces or “confined in a correctional facility.” The Texas
Attorney General has opined, in response to a district attorney’s question, that the possibility of
use of a proxy to obtain a marriage license in Texas may even permit double proxies.119
Specifically, the Attorney General expressed that two inmates would be permitted to obtain a
marriage license while incarcerated, each using his own proxy.120
No Texas authority extends the double proxy rule to participation in the marriage
ceremony. Nonetheless, Texas law rather liberally permits proxy marriage in allowing “any
person” to utilize a proxy for the ceremony rather than limiting its use to members of the armed
forces or the incarcerated.121 The statute requires only that the person using the proxy execute an
affidavit with detailed information about the applicant and an “appointment of any adult… to act
as proxy for the purpose of participating in the ceremony.122 No reported Texas appellate
opinion applies the Texas statute or discusses the Attorney General opinion, and thus the
pragmatic state of Texas law on proxy marriage remains unclear.
116
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The rules in Colorado and Montana are nearly identical. Both states’ statutes provide:
If a party to a marriage is unable to be present at the solemnization, such party
may authorize in writing a third party to act as such party’s proxy. If the person
solemnizing the marriage is satisfied that the absent party is unable to be present
and has consented to the marriage, such person may solemnize the marriage by
proxy. If such person is not satisfied, the parties may petition the district court for
an order permitting the marriage to be solemnized by proxy.123
Thus, both states appear to provide any party a right to marry by proxy, for any reason, so long
as he has properly appointed an agent.
In April 2007, however, Montana began departing from Colorado law through the
addition of a more stringent limitation on the persons who may qualify to marry by proxy.
Specifically, Montana began limiting the use of proxy marriage to military personnel.124 Even
with this limitation, however, Montana is notorious for having the most liberal proxy marriage
scheme in the country because it is the only state allowing double proxies for the marriage
ceremony.125
Finally, California expressly allows for the perfection of a valid proxy marriage in a 2004
statute126 that is both more detailed and more stringent than those found in other states.127
California legislation allows a marriage by agent only for a member of the armed forces of the
United States who is stationed overseas serving in a conflict or a war and is unable to appear for
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the marriage ceremony.128 Moreover, it requires that the party stationed overseas execute a
power of attorney in writing and signed by a notary or witnessed by two officers of the United
States armed forces.129 The California proxy does not allow the absent spouse’s agent to merely
present himself for the first time as a representative at the ceremony.

Rather, the person

appointed must personally appear with the non-absent spouse in order to procure the marriage
license.130 The power of attorney is then presented to the clerk when the marriage license is
obtained and it becomes part of the marriage certificate thereafter.131
Although no reported appellate decision exists applying the portion of California’s statute
sanctioning proxy marriage when one party is a member of the armed forces, a recent California
case suggests the possibility that state law may sanction proxy marriage even for non-military
personnel. In People v. Tami, a criminal case in which defendant Tami was prosecuted for
“filing a false or forged marriage license in a public office,”132 the defendant’s conviction was
reversed on appeal on grounds of insufficient evidence to demonstrate that she knowingly filed a
false or forged document. Interestingly, the reversal of Tami’s conviction rests almost entirely
on the lack of clarity in California law with respect to marriage ceremonies completed outside of
the physical presence of both spouses and an officiant together in the same room.133
Tami does not involve the traditional factual setting giving rise to proxy marriage—two
parties separated by a great distance, likely for employment reasons, with one authorizing a close
friend of relative to “stand in” as a result of the temporary absence. Quite to the contrary, Tami
sought to marry a man living in the same county in which she resided. Nonetheless, it was not
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possible for Tami and her intended to participate in a ceremony before a qualified officiant
together in the same room because Tami’s fiancé was incarcerated in the San Quentin State
Prison.134
Tami sought a marriage license from the Napa County Recorder’s Office and told the
clerk that her fiancé was “not available” to appear.135 The clerk then gave her an affidavit of
inability to appear and told her that she and her fiancé would need to sign the appropriate forms
and then she would need their officiant to accompany her to obtain the license. Tami signed her
fiancé’s name, with his authorization, by tracing his signature from other documents.136 Tami
and her officiant, a Universal Life church minister, then went to a house where Tami, the
officiant, and several witnesses conducted a phone ceremony. The intended groom participated
by telephone from prison.137 Defendant Tami then submitted a marriage certificate, bearing the
signatures of all of the necessary parties, for filing with the county recorder.138 When California
prosecuted Tami for knowingly offering a false or fraudulent document to be filed in the public
records, Tami responded that “a ‘proxy marriage’ performed with one party ‘represented by an
agent’ or present by telephone rather than ‘physically present at the ceremony’ is valid in
California.”139
In reversing Tami’s conviction, the California appellate court made no effort to
distinguish this case from a traditional proxy marriage case, or to determine whether this was
even a case involving proxy marriage at all. In one sense, facts involving telephone participation
in a marriage ceremony may be viewed as something very different from a traditional marriage
134
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by proxy. In a telephone marriage, the parties don’t truly intend that one be represented by an
agent. Rather, his phone presence is his participation; no other person need “stand in” for him.
On the other hand, both a traditional proxy scenario and a telephone ceremony raise the same
core question—can the California statutory requirement that parties declare their consent “in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and necessary witnesses” be met in any manner
other than a personal physical presence of all necessary persons in the same room at the same
time?140 Because that core issue is the same whether the marriage at issue is one of a serviceman
represented by an agent or a prisoner participating by telephone, the court focused its discussion
on the validity of proxy marriage in California.
Unfortunately, the Tami court declined to decide whether proxy marriages are legal in
California. Rather, because the crime of which Tami was convicted required a “knowing”
violation of the law, the court focused on what Tami knew, or should have known, about the
validity of a California proxy marriage.
The Tami court cited three prior decisions bearing on the validity of proxy marriage in
California. One, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, actually
applied Nevada law to a California resident.141 But in so doing, the court first found that Nevada
law sanctioning proxy marriage does not violate any strong public policy in California.142 The
Ninth Circuit went on to say that proxy marriages are really no different from more traditional
marriages, do not necessarily present any serious questions of consent, and are occasionally
necessary for equitable reasons.143 Citing this Ninth Circuit case, a California appellate court
seemed to approve of California proxy marriages in a legal malpractice case twelve years
140

See CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. § 420 (2004 & Supp. 2010).
People v. Tami, No. A099263, 2003 WL 22235337, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (citing to Barrons v. United
States, 191 F.2d 92, 96 (9th Cir. 1951)).
142
Barrons, 191 F.2d at 95.
143
Id. at 95–96.
141

24

later.144 Finally, another California appellate court assumed the validity of a Jordanian proxy
marriage in deciding whether to enforce a dowry contract.145 Viewing these three cases together,
the Tami court described California law on the validity of proxy marriage as “unsettled.”146 The
court further held that defendant Tami’s conviction could not be upheld because of insufficient
proof that she knew her telephone marriage was invalid, particularly in light of the “public policy
objective to promote and protect the marriage relationship.”147
The Tami court’s reliance on at least two of three precedents to suggest that proxy
marriage is generally acceptable in California is noticeably flawed. That California would
recognize the legality of a proxy marriage perfected in Nevada or Jordan does not mean that such
a marriage is legally sanctioned by California law. It is common under principles of full faith
and credit and comity for one state to give effect to a marriage validly perfected in another
jurisdiction.148 Nonetheless, the court’s reluctance to state that proxy marriage is not generally
permitted in California and its description of the law as “unsettled” certainly suggests that
California courts may be more receptive to arguments urging the validity of a proxy marriage
outside the military context than the plain language of California statutes implies.149
The cases demonstrate that California law with regard to proxy marriage is clear on at
least one front—marriage by proxy is expressly and clearly sanctioned by statute for certain
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members of the armed services. For ordinary citizens, Tami signals that state law on proxy
marriage may be in flux.
Even beyond these five states which expressly allow it, however, proxy marriage has
significant legal effects. In states which require that both spouses have a personal physical
presence at the marriage ceremony and do not allow spouses to use agents to perfect a
ceremonial marriage,150 proxy marriages are almost always recognized and given legal effect if
they are perfected in a state which permits them.151 As a result, the impacts of the legality of
proxy marriage are felt throughout the United States.
2.

More Fulsome Recognition Abroad

Outside of the United States, proxy marriage is far better recognized, particularly in
Central and South American countries. Brazil,152 Argentina,153 Paraguay,154 Colombia,155
Bolivia,156 Peru,157 Uruguay,158 Venezuela,159 Ecuador,160 Panama,161 El Salvador,162 Costa
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Rica,163 Mexico,164 and Cuba165 all permit a party to fulfill the requirements of a ceremonial
marriage through the use of an agent.166 It is perhaps not so surprising that these countries share
in the acceptance of proxy marriage, as they are all civilian jurisdictions with legal systems
derived directly from Roman law,167 which always permitted marriages by proxy.168 These
countries simply carried forward the Roman law allowing the use of agents in perfecting a
marital contract.169
Much of Europe still permits marriages perfected by proxy as well, and likely for the
same historical reasons. The doctrine still exists in France,170 Spain,171 Italy,172 and Poland.173
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Finally, virtually all of the countries governed by Islamic law sanction proxy marriage,174
and do so very broadly, allowing double proxies175 and often giving the proxy “unlimited
discretion” to enter into marriage contracts, including the power to choose a mate on behalf of
the principal.176
Overall, the global community is far more liberal in permitting the application of agency
principles to the marital relationship.177 And this widespread acceptance of proxy marriage is
significant because it bleeds into America. Even if we refuse to recognize proxy marriages
celebrated within American borders, because we give effect to such marriages validly perfected
abroad,178 the general legal attitude toward the use of agents to perfect the marriage contract
around the globe is important in shaping American policy.
II.

AGENCY IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS

Since the start of the recognition of agency theory thousands of years ago, the powers
which can be delegated to an agent have been exceptionally broad.179 Traditionally, agency was
permissibly created for any lawful purpose.180 The only question that needed to be asked was
whether the principal himself had the authority to do what he appointed an agent to do.181
Indeed, there are generally only two exceptions to the theory that an agent can be appointed to do
one of the future spouses resides abroad and serious reasons exist, to be appraised by the tribunal in whose
jurisdiction the other future spouse resides. . . .”).
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anything that the principal himself can do.182 First, agency authority may not be created for the
performance of an act that is unlawful or otherwise violates public policy.183 Second, the
“nondelegable acts doctrine” prohibits agency delegation of acts exceptionally “personal in
nature.”184
Precisely what falls within the domain of the nondelegable acts doctrine has been a tricky
question for courts and legal scholars. The theory is clear enough—that acts which rest upon
some special skill or personal quality of the principal must be performed by him alone and their
performance may not be delegated to another.185 In practice, however, determining precisely
where the line between intimate, nondelegable acts and those for which agency principles may
freely apply should be drawn has been nearly impossible.186 Still, agency scholars have spoken
rather confidently for years about a select few intimate relationships.187 Because “it is expected
that [a] testator will exercise his own judgment concerning his relationship with [his would-be]
donees, their needs, his relationship to them, and the like,” proxy will-making has long been
considered precisely the type of transaction covered under the nondelegable acts doctrine.188
Creation of custodial rights over a child has also been viewed as an intimate act unsuitable for
agency’s application.189 Medical decision-making historically was excluded from the domain of
agency. And, of course, taking marriage vows by proxy is not generally tolerated.190
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With the sole exception of marriage, however, legal thinking on the propriety of agency
law’s application to each of these intimate relationships has changed drastically in the last thirty
years. While once described as “doubtless” nondelegable acts,191 proxy will-making, contracts
to transfer child custody, and grants of authority to another to make health care decisions are all
now permissible. Only marriage remains as an intimate transaction not yet reevaluated under the
nondelegable acts doctrine.
A.

Will-making by Proxy—a “Notably New Development”192
Much like the contract of marriage, the making of a will “holds a unique and revered

position in our collective psyche.”193 A will is among the most personal and significant legal
acts in which a person engages.194 Nonetheless, the use of agents in will-making has long been
recognized for the purpose of carrying out necessary will formalities. And in the last twenty
years, the use of agency principles in the wills context has increased to such a degree that, for the
first time in history, an agent may even be able to make dispositions, essentially creating an
entire will, on the testator’s behalf. The acceptance of proxy will-making has progressed slowly,
and is continuing still, but it signals a substantial erosion of the theory that agency principles are
necessarily inappropriate for application to intimate affairs.
When considering a person’s ability to legally use a proxy in creating a will, the
distinction between a “proxy signature” and a true “proxy will” must be closely observed. The
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two have been treated differently for centuries, with the idea of a proxy signature in a will being
far better accepted.195
It is often possible that a testator unable to comply with will-making form requirements,
perhaps because he is physically incapable of signing his will, may use an agent to execute a will
in proper form.196 Typically, state laws require that the infirm testator signify the instrument at
issue is, in fact, his testament, and then direct a proxy to sign his name.197 Even the Uniform
Probate Code, which clearly prefers a will signed by the testator himself, allows a will to be
signed instead “by some other person in the testator’s presence and by his direction.”198
Such a proxy transaction differs from proxy marriage in one significant way. In the wills
context, the testator himself is present when the agent signs,199 while the very purpose of
sanctioning proxy marriage is to allow marriages to take place between parties at a distance.200
Nonetheless, both situations involve nothing more than the legal acceptance of an alternate
means of complying with a form requirement—typically the signature of two witnesses or
acknowledgment before a notary in the case of a will,201 and a ceremonial declaration of consent
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in a marriage.202 That the law has sanctioned use of an agent to comply with will formalities
suggests that the formalities a party must accomplish to enter into the marriage contract should
be permissibly accomplished with the aid of an agent as well.
Even more compelling is the recent trend toward applying agency principles to allow a
person not to merely sign a will on the principal’s behalf, but to actually decide upon
dispositions for the principal, essentially creating an entire will for him. Historically, it was
impossible to create a valid will by proxy. Roman law dating back to the sixth century rejected
the practice,203 viewing a will made by anyone other than the testator as a will that could not be
regarded as the testator’s will at all.204 Agency theory was well-recognized in both early Roman
and English law;205 it simply was not applied in the wills context.206 Will-making was viewed as
an “inalienable right” early in the law’s development.207 And many centuries later, that view
generally persists both in the United States and abroad.208
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However, in seven states, and under the Uniform Probate Code, recent changes allow the
conservator of an incapacitated person to make a will on the incapacitated’s behalf.209 Though
the rule applies only in situations involving conservatorship, agency principles are the backbone
of this legal development.210 A conservator-agent makes a will, on behalf of his principal, when
the principal is incapacitated and therefore unable to act personally.211
The idea of a conservator as proxy will maker is a new one. Conservators hold great
power to act on behalf of the incapacitated persons they protect.212 But even so, a conservator’s
power to act on behalf of a protected party has historically excluded will-making authority. It is
only in the last twenty years that states have begun to accept the conservator’s making of a will
for the incapacitated party.213 And as of 2008, the Uniform Probate Code now even sanctions the
conservator’s power to make, amend, or revoke a will on behalf of a protected person.214
The theory legitimizing such conduct is one of “substituted judgment.”215 Proxy wills
made by conservators are said to “reflect a substituted judgment of what the protected person
would want had he retained capacity . . . .”216 Moreover, the extension of will-making power to
a conservator has increasingly been deemed necessary as a matter of equity given the breadth of
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a conservator’s authority.217 Conservators already have the power to dispose of their protected
persons’ property in a substantial way by engaging in “inter vivos estate planning through will
substitutes,”218 and thus, granting will-making power to conservators does not represent a severe
extension of the powers they already hold over the property of the protected person.219 Perhaps
more importantly, allowing a conservator to draft a will may be the only way to accomplish what
the incapacitated person needs or clearly desires—whether that is revoking a disposition,
changing a beneficiary, or creating a will from scratch to avoid the disposition rules of intestate
succession.220 “Why should a conservator not be able to accomplish directly by will precisely
what the protected person would have accomplished had she retained testamentary capacity?”221
Responding sympathetically to that question, the developing trend in state law is to allow proxy
wills by conservator, with protections to minimize the risk of abuse.222
Still, the reality of increasing acceptance for proxy will-making by conservators does not
equate to widespread acceptance of proxy will-making in general. Outside the conservatorship
context, when a testator remains fully capable of making his own will, his ability to delegate that
power to an agent is less clear. The Uniform Probate Code, which expressly sanctions willmaking by conservator, is silent on the application of agency principles to will-making absent
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conservatorship.223 The Uniform Power of Attorney Act, which provides default rules regarding
the creation and scope of powers of attorney, likewise takes no stance on proxy will-making by
agents generally.224
At least two states have been more explicit. California legislation provides that “a power
of attorney may not authorize an attorney-in-fact to make, publish, declare, amend, or revoke the
principal’s will.225 In Arkansas, an appellate decision stating in dicta that agency doctrine cannot
support an agent’s making of a will on behalf of the principal describes “the decision of who,
what, when, and how one’s property is to be distributed upon death” as a personal one that may
be made only by the testator himself.226 Elsewhere, state law remains mute on proxy willmaking by agent.
It may well be that will-making by a non-conservator agent is never fully accepted by
state law, but the recent extension of will-making powers to conservators, which would not have
been sanctioned in any state twenty years ago, certainly signals a change in our view of willmaking as a task too personal for the application of agency principles. At least where the
equities shift in favor of allowing someone other than the testator to make his will because the
testator can no longer do so himself, concerns over the intimate nature of will making have been
shoved aside. One scholar has persuasively argued that the evolution of the law on will-making
by conservators does, and indeed should, begin to compel movement in state law toward
accepting wills made through agents more generally.227 As someone “personally selected by the
protected person and presumably in the best position to know what the protected person would
desire,” an agent is even better-suited to make a will on his principal’s behalf than is a
223
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conservator.228 With protections for the testator—including a requirement that authority to make
a will be given expressly, perhaps—even proxy will-making by agent may garner more
widespread approval.
And even if proxy will-making by agent is never fully accepted, the “notably new
development” of affording conservators the power to make wills on behalf of the parties they
protect has significant implications in the marital context.229 The penetration of agency rules
into will-making, even by conservator, more heavily intrudes into a personal province than does
the creation of a marriage by proxy. A conservator or agent making a will for the person he
represents makes exceptionally detailed and intimate decisions, necessarily identifying objects of
bounty for the testator and selecting the terms of his dispositions.230 By contrast, an agent in a
proxy marriage merely carries out the necessary formalities of a contract, the details of which the
principal has already expressed his approval. In contrast to the proxy will-maker, then, there is
no real discretion to be exercised by an agent in the marriage context. The law’s recognition of
the need to allow will-making by proxy highlights the logic of also recognizing marriages by
proxy, particularly because the manner in which an agent is used in proxy marriage and his
function in that context is comparatively minor and ministerial.
B.

Delegating a Child’s Care, Custody and Control
The relationship between parent and child is viewed as one of the most sacred formed

under the law. The law serves to protect that bond in myriad ways,231 and interference with
parental decision-making for children must tread lightly or risk trampling a parent’s Troxel-
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recognized constitutional rights.232 The mere fact of a biological link between parents and
children creates not only parental rights, but also substantial responsibilities.

Parents are

required to support their children,233 to provide for their care,234 even to educate them235 and to
more generally foster their wellbeing.236 These duties generally cannot be abdicated237 and the
government takes Herculean steps to ensure that parents respect the relationship by fulfilling
their legal responsibilities toward their children.238 The parent-child relationship, then, is most
certainly a heavily protected one, regulated in large part because of its highly intimate nature.239
The law of contract would seem to have little application in this intimate context. But even here,
agency principles permeate the relationship in a significant way.
Most notably, agency doctrine encroaches upon the very personal parent-child
relationship in the custody context. In every state, custody is viewed through the lens of the best
interest of the child.240 Natural parents generally exercise custody unless there is a court finding
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that such an arrangement is not in the child’s best interest.241 And when a non-parent is
embroiled in a custody dispute with a parent, a court not only considers the child’s best interest,
but typically must make a finding that custody in a parent would result in substantial harm to the
child before awarding custody to a non-parent.242 The heightened standard is, again, a function
of the notion that the parent-child relationship is an important one that must suffer minimal
intrusion.243 The court serves as gatekeeper of the intimate relationship between parent and
child. Even so, in the last fifteen years, the law has begun to rather freely recognize the right of a
parent to utilize agency principles to confer custody of a minor child, albeit temporarily, to an
agent.
Agency principles have begun to apply rather purely, even in the heavily regulated
custody regime, through doctrines alternatively dubbed “provisional custody by mandate,”
“custodial power of attorney,” or “standby guardianship.” In provisional custody by mandate, a
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parent with custody, or both parents if married, designate a mandatary or agent244 to “provide for
the care, custody, and control of a minor child.”245 The agent’s authority is merely temporary
under these contractual delegations of custody.246

Louisiana, which has perhaps the most

detailed statutory scheme, allows a parent to grant custody to an agent by contract for a
maximum period of one year, and provides that the contract may terminate even earlier for
prescribed causes, including revocation of agency authority, renunciation by the agent, or a lapse
of time after the death of the principal.247

Other states’ statutory schemes are less

comprehensive, but largely provide for the same contractual agency relationship. In Washington
D.C., a child’s parent may grant another person a “revocable custodial power of attorney” to
provide for the child’s care.248 In Pennsylvania, standby guardianship rules—which in most
states act as a “springing guardianship” to allow a parent to name a guardian for a child who will
assume authority only upon the parent’s death and after court approval249—extend to permit the
mere written designation of a standby guardian to take effect immediately upon execution.250 The
standby guardian can act as the guardian of the minor without the direction of the court for a
period of sixty days, after which the guardian must file a petition for approval to continue.251 In
each of these cases, then, parents confer the most sacred of rights to an agent by mere execution
of a contract and without court oversight or control.
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Parents have used these rules to transfer temporary custody to agents, most frequently
grandparents and aunts,252 for a variety of reasons ranging from illness and hospitalization to
military deployments overseas to changes of residency for purposes of enrolling in a better
public school.253 And while the conference of rights and duties so serious as those inherent in
the parent-child relationship may seem inappropriately delegated through simple contract, the
law recognizes such transfers out of perceived necessity. No other legal device allows a parent
to retain custody, and thereby avoid relinquishing it entirely on a permanent basis, and yet still
provide for the care of a child when she cannot do so, or perhaps does not wish to do so.
Once again, equity permits the intrusion of agency principles into a bond perhaps even
more intimate than that between spouses. Agency is even used in this context to create a
relationship whereby a person exercises care, custody and control over a minor child.
Logic and consistency compel a re-evaluation of the creation of a marital relationship
through agency as well. Such a re-evaluation is particularly appropriate considering that an
agent exercising custody makes many significant and repeated decisions for the child’s welfare,
typically unguided by the wishes of the principal. In the proxy marriage context, by contrast, the
proxy makes no significant choices on behalf of the principal. The decision to enter into the
marital relationship is made even before the proxy’s appointment and the proxy’s role is merely
to serve as a stand-in to fulfill a form requirement. If agency has application in creating far more
significant and personal custodial relationships, it should apply to create spousal relationships as
well.
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C.

Death by Agent
At common law, it has been frequently observed that “no right is held more sacred, or is

more carefully guarded . . . than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others. . . .”254 The right to autonomy over
one’s body is rooted in a constitutional right of privacy, and has been held to extend to freedom
in approving of or rejecting medical treatment.255 Consistent with that right, American courts in
the last thirty years have begun to recognize an individual’s right not only to make medical
decisions for himself, but to appoint an agent for the purpose, even where the decision-making
involves critical questions implicating life and death.
Legal recognition of the applicability of agency principles in medical decision-making
has come about rather slowly. Traditionally, agency doctrine could not apply to most health care
situations in which it was truly needed. An agency relationship at common law terminated
automatically at the incapacity of the principal.256 And the help of another in engaging in
medical decision-making is typically needed only when the interested party himself is
incapacitated such that his is unable to personally make those decisions.257 As a result, prior
agency appointments were virtually useless in conveying decision-making authority for critical
health care matters.258 That result wasn’t viewed as exceptionally problematic to scholars in the
early twentieth century, however, as there was much speculation at the time that “medical

254

Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
Fowler, supra note 179, at 988–89.
256
MECHEM, supra note 14, § 677, 480. For a justification of this rule, see Id. § 676, 480 (“The act of every agent
exercising a bare power of attorney necessarily presupposes, as has been seen, the existence of a principal competent
to perform the same act himself in his own behalf. It is his will that is being carried out through the medium of the
agent. If for any reason, therefore, the principal becomes incapable of acting and exercising and intelligent will in
regard to the transaction, it is evident that an essential element in the relation is lacking, and while that element
remains absent, the further exercise of the relation must be suspended.”).
257
Fowler, supra note 179, at 1012 n. 174.
258
Id. at 1014–15.
255

41

decision-making might fall within [the] narrow category of actions too personal to be
delegated.”259
Beginning in the 1970s, however, the power of attorney was gradually revolutionized to
allow agency authority to persist beyond the principal’s incapacity.260 States, and even the
Uniform Probate Code in 1969, began to recognize the “durable power of attorney,” durable in
the sense that it would last past the incapacity of the principal and up to the moment of his
death.261 Such a power of attorney could, in accordance with the state law and the desires of the
principal, either come into effect immediately upon execution or “spring” into effect upon the
occurrence of a triggering event such as the principal’s incapacity,262 without the need for any
court approval or proceeding.263 In either event, the durable power of attorney was a useful
extension of traditional common law agency principles because it allowed the agent to continue
to act with respect to the principal’s affairs—managing his finances and buying and selling
property—when the principal was unable to do so himself. As a result, the durable power of
attorney has long been viewed as a logical and equitable extension of agency law insofar as it
gives a trusted person exercising substituted judgment the authority to act in a manner that the
principal likely would have desired.264 By 1984, the durable power of attorney was a part of the
law in all fifty states.265
The clear extension of the durable power of attorney to medical decision-making,
however, has come about more slowly as a result of the perception that the authority to make life
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and death decisions on behalf of another might just be a “nondelegable” act outside the ambit of
agency law.266 The concern, of course, is that the power the agent wields in these circumstances
is “extraordinary”267 and “the basic policy underlying the nondelegable acts doctrine is that some
decisions should be made personally—or not made at all.”268 Even in the wake of the creation of
the durable power of attorney, agency scholars and lawyers questioned whether health care
decisions were of the sort that just should not be made at all if they could not be made by the
affected person himself.269
Today, the power of attorney has evolved such that it is clear it may be used as a device
to permit the appointment of an agent for medical decision-making.270 Despite the intimate
nature of the choices made by the agent in the face of the principal’s incapacity, the right to
make such choices is now widely recognized as falling within agency authority.271 The history
of the durable power of attorney itself helped states to reach that conclusion. It is evident from
266
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writings of the committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
charged with drafting a model durable power of attorney law that the purpose of its creation was
to provide incompetents with “assistance in caring for their property rights or personal affairs, or
for protecting their property or personal rights.”272 Slowly, the view has come to predominate
that the drafters of durable power of attorney statutes must have contemplated the making of
health care decisions as precisely one of those acts for which authority could be, and most often
would be, conveyed to an agent.273
There is no doubt that the decisions made by an agent under a durable power of attorney,
at least with regard to the health care of the principal, are complex and personal. The agent
needs to “assess risks and costs, speak to friends and relatives…, consider a variety of
therapeutic options, seek the opinions of other physicians, evaluate the … condition and
prospects for recovery”—in short, make exactly the kind of tough choices the principal himself
would be required to make absent the power of attorney.274 Still, the law has come to recognize
the principal’s right to select a proxy to speak for him in making life and death decision. Where
the charge placed upon the agent would be much less severe—merely carrying out a form
requirement rather than making critical decisions—the same possibilities should be extended to
principals desiring to perfect ceremonial marriage requirements by proxy.
III.
A.

THE EVOLVING CASE FOR PROXY MARRIAGE275

Equitable Necessity in the Twenty-First Century
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The legality of proxy marriage certainly seems to be nothing more than an academic
inquiry. After all, marrying with the use of representatives is exceptionally unromantic.276 And
in an age in which marriage is viewed almost exclusively as the outcome of romantic love,277 one
might assume that so few couples would choose to marry by proxy that its legality would be
almost irrelevant. In fact, precisely the opposite is true. Contemporary demand for proxy
marriage is startlingly strong, brought about in large part by the many advantages afforded to
married persons that their unmarried counterparts do not share.
1.

The Groups Which Stand to Benefit From Proxy Marriage

In Montana, the only American state to allow marriages by double proxy,278 county
officials were so overwhelmed with proxy marriage applications—nearly thirty per month in
Flathead County alone—that they changed state law in 2007 to restrict proxy marriage to
situations in which one spouse is either a Montana resident or member of the armed forces.279
County clerks complained that they simply could not otherwise handle the sheer volume of proxy
marriage requests.280 The change may not have brought about its intended effect. Three years
later, even with a very narrow proxy marriage rule, Montana officials in Flathead County report
that they process as many as eighty double proxy marriages each month.281
Demand for proxy marriage among American citizens is strong, brought about, in large
part, by the sheer number of armed forces stationed away from home. That number approached
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300,000 in 2008.282 And while at first blush that figure seems to pale in comparison with the
four million men serving in the armed forces in World War I, the lengthy duration of America’s
continued occupation in Afghanistan and Iraq makes the number of troops who have served
abroad in the last decade approximate that when proxy marriage was viewed as a necessity.
Of course, military personnel are not the only group for whom proxy marriage might be
an attractive option. Any couple separated by a substantial distance might find the doctrine
useful. In fact, the history of Montana’s proxy marriage law demonstrates that it grew not out of
a demand among members of the armed forces, but rather from miners populating the area in the
1860s, who typically came from out of state and desired to wed their “far-flung fiancées.”283
Today, and particularly in the current troubled economy, far more Americans are forced to seek
employment and remain far from home or their significant others for a lengthy period.284
Thousands of American citizens find themselves in such a situation, and while the number of
those persons desiring to perfect a proxy marriage is certainly just a small fraction of those who
work away from home, modern employment conditions have no doubt significantly bolstered
demand for proxy marriage as a result of increasing long-distance employment over the last
century.285
Finally, the number of same sex individuals in committed relationships, who often desire
the rights and responsibilities of marriage, and who might take advantage of proxy rules in a
state allowing same sex marriage, has also increased dramatically since proxy marriage was born
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in this country.286 In the 1920s and 1930s, a gay and lesbian culture was just beginning to take
hold in the United States.287 Today, there are reportedly 710,000 acknowledged homosexual
Americans288 and the 2010 census figures are expected to report a substantial increase in the
number of those persons involved in committed relationships.289

Because gay and lesbian

couples can only legally marry in a few American jurisdictions, their only option for perfecting a
valid marriage is to endure the hardship of traveling to a jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex
marriage and does not restrict its application to residents.290
Constituents of all of the above-described groups are likely to desire to marry by proxy at
levels not yet seen before, stemming from the fact that they cannot perfect a ceremonial
marriage. The availability of the proxy marriage option would confer a panoply of advantages
no other legal status can bring, both to the spouses themselves and to their children.291
2.

The Benefits of Proxy Marriage

Perhaps foremost among the rights a party might seek through a proxy marriage are
immigration benefits. A controversial English case which recently made headlines provides an
instructive example. Two English residents, a Polish citizen and a Brazilian citizen, were
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married by double proxy in Brazil while they remained in London.292 The marriage made the
Brazilian husband the spouse of a European Union citizen, thus conferring upon him the right to
remain in England permanently.293 British immigration officials acknowledged the validity of
the couple’s proxy marriage in Brazil, but argued it was used in this case to circumvent English
immigration policy,294 which would have denied immigration effects to a marriage perfected in
England because the intended husband was in the country on only a temporary visitor’s visa.295
Immigration officials essentially bemoaned the spouses taking advantage of what they described
as a “loophole” in immigration policy by engaging in a proxy marriage.296 When the husband
was denied resident status, he sued, arguing that a refusal to grant him UK residency violated his
human rights. A lower court immigration judge agreed, and the House of Lords ended the
controversy when it ruled in late 2008 that further investigating the motives of the couple’s
Brazilian proxy marriage would be a breach of their human rights.297 The parties to this proxy
marriage insist that their marriage is “genuine,” “not a sham,” and that they strongly desired to
marry but simply could not bear the cost and complication of traveling to Poland or Brazil to do
so.298

Proxy marriage was their only option, and an option that conferred substantial

immigration advantages on the husband.
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In a high profile case closer to home, an American resident claimed permanent resident
status based on a proxy marriage to a deceased Marine.299 Hotaru Ferschke is a Japanese citizen
who married an American serviceman by proxy in Japan after he deployed for service in Iraq and
she learned she was pregnant with his child.300 One month after the proxy marriage, Ferschke’s
husband was killed during a house raid in Iraq.301

Ferschke sought to obtain permanent

residency in the United States for herself and her son, as the spouse and child of an American
citizen.302

The federal government denied her request because the parties’ marriage was

perfected by proxy. And while the United States government recognizes, for immigration
purposes, proxy marriages valid in the jurisdiction in which they were contracted,303 it imposes
the additional requirement of consummation before a proxy marriage can confer immigration
status.304 Because Ferschke and her husband did not live together or engage in sexual activity
after their marriage, she was denied permanent residency.305

Immigration officials have

expressed distress over the case, noting the sacrifices of Ferschke’s family for this country, but
believe the law allows no other outcome.306 Ferschke sought the help of three United States
Congressmen, who introduced a private bill to aid her. But Congress has taken no action on the
bill thus far, and Ferschke’s status remains unresolved. She returned to Japan in January of
2010.307
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It is obvious from the Ferschke story that not all attempts to use proxy marriage to obtain
immigration advantages are successful. Still, the two stories together demonstrate well the
potential advantages of a proxy marriage to better the immigration status of foreign residents,
often in deserving cases.
In addition to immigration status, marriage confers a staggering array of property rights
upon the parties to it. The right to succeed from a deceased spouse who leaves no will,308 the
right to an elective share when a spouse dies with a will,309 life insurance benefits, pension
payments, health insurance coverage, and a whole host of other entitlements are given to spouses
alone.310 In the military context, there are a number of more particular advantages provided to
spouses of active duty armed forces, particularly when they are killed in combat.311 For instance,
the United States government pays a “death gratuity” of $100,000 to the surviving spouse of a
member of the armed forces who dies on active duty.312 Both inside and outside the military
context, then, marriage provides substantial property entitlements to its parties. And when they
are unable to undergo a ceremonial marriage because of impossibility or exceptional
inconvenience, proxy marriage is the only means of conferring the advantages of marriage that
both parties so desire.
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Finally, children may have much at stake in the recognition of their parents’ proxy
marriage.

While children born both inside and outside of marriage are now generally

recognized, on constitutional grounds, to have the same rights and duties vis-à-vis their
parents,313 the ease with which they may assert these rights still differs based on their parents’
marital status.314 Children born during the marriage of their parents, or within a reasonable
period after the dissolution of their parents’ marriage, enjoy a legal presumption of filiation.315
The child born to a married American servicemember on duty overseas, for instance, would not
have to suffer the expense and inconvenience of proving paternity before receiving legal
recognition as the servicemember’s descendant.

The law would presume him the

servicemember’s son, and treat him as such unless and until a party with a contrary interest
proved otherwise.316 But the protections of a filiative presumption depend upon marriage of the
child’s parents. And again, when parents are unable to perfect a ceremonial marriage, a proxy
marriage may be the only means of creating presumptions that aid children in establishing the
parent-child relationship.
In short, the need for a narrow doctrine legalizing proxy marriage is great, brought about
by a more geographically diverse society.

Law and policy makers must recognize that a

changing culture demands a new look at whether rules which exclude the use of agents in the
marriage ceremony continue to effect equity in the twenty-first century.
B.

The Protective Mechanisms of the Power of Attorney
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Perhaps one of the most significant obstacles that has prevented American courts and
legislatures from widely recognizing the validity of proxy marriages all these years is nothing
more than fear. Fear of the limitations of agency to effect justice in an intimate context is
palpable. As one scholar has noted, “there is always the possibility that an agent will make an
irrational decision that needlessly” harms the principal.317 Fear of the application of agency
principles to the marriage contract should not overshadow the potential for equitable gains,
however. General agency law includes a multitude of mechanisms designed to protect both
principals and agents, which are particularly helpful when analyzed in the marital context.
Moreover, the basic principles of agency can be slightly tailored with little difficulty where
necessary to better fit the marriage contract. Essentially, by divesting the proxy of nearly all
discretion and requiring exceptional specificity in a writing creating the agency relationship, a
regime can be created which permits proxy marriage, but at the same time allays the fears which
have posed hurdles to its recognition for so many years.
1.

The Straightjacket of Form

As a general matter, agency relationships need not be created in writing.318

The

principal-agent relationship, which is a contractual one, may come about by mere oral
agreement,319 or perhaps even tacitly.320 Nonetheless, the law has long recognized the need for
more solemnity in the creation of an agency relationship for certain significant transactions.321
The common law “equal dignity rule” serves to appropriately regulate the form necessary for a
document creating an agency relationship by requiring the power of attorney to be in writing if a
317
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writing is required for the underlying transaction for which the agent is given authority to act.322
Therefore, a power of attorney to alienate property on behalf of the principal or bind the
principal as a surety must be in writing and must expressly confer authority to undertake specific
action rather than generally grant the agent responsibility for handling all the affairs of the
principal.323 Some states have gone beyond the pure common law formulation of the equal
dignity rule to require that the agency contract not only be in writing, but in whatever particular
form is required of the underlying transaction.324 Still others require particular types of agency
contracts to assume the law’s highest form requirements; the durable power of attorney, for
instance, frequently must be executed before a notary and two witnesses.325
In the marriage context, application of the most restrictive equal dignity rule would lead
to absurd results. Requiring a power of attorney for a proxy marriage to be perfected before a
qualified officiant, typically a religious official or judicial officer,326 for instance, makes little
sense. The law has recognized as much in the corporate context or “when an agent acts only as
an amanuensis who signs at the principal’s request,” where the equal dignity doctrine has been
set aside as illogical.327
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Still, the evidentiary and cautionary functions of ceremonial marriage requirements328
could be served by requiring that a power of attorney to marry be executed in writing, at a
minimum.

Requiring even more—the presence of a notary or witnesses—would also be

consistent with agency principles in the intimate area of the durable power of attorney329 and
would be a reasonable demand to make of those desiring to perfect a proxy marriage.330
2.

Specificity and Duration Limitations

Form requirements aside, a number of foreign jurisdictions which sanction proxy
marriage have imposed additional mandates on a power of attorney to marry which the United
States could borrow in a manner consistent with American agency principles. Most central and
south American countries, for example, require that the “other party to the marriage . . . be
clearly and unmistakably designated by name in the document appointing the proxy [and] that
the marriage can be concluded with this person only and with nobody else . . . .”331 Other
jurisdictions require a specification of the “place, day, and hour designated for the celebration of
the marriage.”332 Some countries even limit the maximum duration of a power of attorney to
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marry to a relatively short period.333 In Italy, for instance, a proxy marriage must be celebrated
within 180 days of the grant of agency authority.334 Such specificity and duration restrictions
would allow American courts to recognize the equitable need for proxy marriage, while at the
same time limiting the breadth of the authority granted to the agent.
3.

The Possibility of Revocation

Principles of revocation, which may arise in any agency contract, can also play a role in
protecting principals to proxy marriages. An agency contract is typically revocable at the will of
the principal,335 and this general rule should apply in the marital context as well. Indeed,
scholars have long observed that the revocable nature of the power of attorney is a consideration
which strongly militates against legally recognizing proxy marriage.336 The worry is that the
ability of the principal to revoke his proxy’s authority at any time may result in marriages which
do not meet with the principal’s changed desires.337
Agency law is already well equipped to deal with the familiar problem of revocation,
however. Because a revocation may have substantial effects on third parties, it is not effective in
withdrawing the agent’s authority until the agent receives notice of the revocation.338 The
burden placed upon the principal is slight—he must simply communicate his change of heart to
(trans. Julio Romanach, Jr., Lawrence Publishing Co., 2003) (“The parties or their specially empowered agents,
constituted in the manner provided in Article 44, as well as two witnesses to each of the parties that verify their
identity, must be present before the Civil Registry judge at the place, day and hour designated for the celebration of
the marriage. . . .”).
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333
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334
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the principal before the hour he designated for his act arrives.339 In the marital context, the
application of this general rule adequately protects the principal, who would be bound only to
marriages to which he specifically consented and which were contracted before he gave his duly
appointed agent notice of his changed intent.
4.

The Discretionless Power of Attorney

The confines of American agency law are, in all of the ways set out above, already welldesigned to serve the parties to a proxy marriage. The specificity that could be required in the
power of attorney and the fact that all the agent really does is stand-in to meet a form
requirement really means the proxy in a proxy marriage is not a proxy, or true agent, at all. “The
proxy is . . . nothing but a messenger, a ‘porte-parole,’ ‘nuntius,’ ‘Bote.’”340 He has no authority
whatsoever to inject himself into the legal sphere of the party who appointed him. The proxy’s
own will does not enter into the picture.”341 The role of the proxy and the power of attorney’s
protective mechanisms provide comfort, then, in ensuring that entry into one of the law’s most
intimate relationships is made by will and intention of the principal himself. And because the
law already sanctions the application of agency principles in other intimate areas—including
will-making, transferring child custody, and creating durable powers of attorney—all of which
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give the agent substantially more decision-making authority,342 the modest role of an agent in a
proxy marriage should be easily tolerated.
IV.

TOWARD A WEDDING WITH NO BRIDE AND NO GROOM343

Proxy marriage fails to conform well to today’s wedding fairy tale. It requires no white
dress, no fancy flowers or cake, and no limousine to carry the new bride and groom into their
future.344 At best, it’s a wholly unromantic way to perfect the contract of marriage. Nonetheless,
it is a useful, even necessary, avenue to marriage for many couples who want undertake the
lifetime of rights and duties associated with marriage but are unable to fulfill typical ceremonial
marriage requirements.
Fear and consternation associated with a departure from strict adherence to the
requirements of traditional, ceremonial marriage is misplaced.

By allowing common law

marriage, the law in many American jurisdictions has already gone rather far in creating inroads
to the requirement that a marriage be celebrated formally with both spouses physically present in
the same room at the same time.345 Allowing spouses to celebrate a marriage with the assistance
of agents is perhaps even less troubling, particularly considering that the law already sanctions
the use of agents in other intimate transactions such as will-making, transferring child custody,
and even making end-of-life decisions. In fact, we often view agency law as designed to do
precisely what we fear in the marriage context, namely, allow the principal to authorize an agent
to act for him in a significant, often personal, transaction.346
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Creating symmetry in agency law by sanctioning proxy marriage is simply the next
logical step in the evolution of agency principles as applied to intimate relationships. It is a step
that can be taken confidently given that the agent in a proxy marriage may be given far less
discretion and decision-making responsibility than he is afforded in other personal dealings, and
given the strong foundation of protection that American agency rules already affords principals
through form requirements, duration restrictions, and revocation rules.

In short, agency

principles are ripe for application to the contract of marriage, and the idea of a proxy marriage—
a groomless, perhaps even brideless wedding—should be embraced.
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